Editorial Comments
Comments
‘Inhospitable Sea’ The Black Sea and the role of the Russian Navy in the Russia-Ukraine War to mid-September 2022
Opinion Piece
Maritime Security in the Real World: A Master Mariner's Perspective
Articles
Evaluation of the maritime security threats and issues to the future of the shipping industry – Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships
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Nowadays traditional manned commercial sea-going vessels are facing several difficulties, including shipping accidents that are mainly caused by human errors and the shortage of seafarers with the associated increased manning cost. In 2021, the International Maritime Organisation Maritime Safety Committee (IMO MSC) had finished the Regulatory Scoping Exercise (RSE) regarding Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) at its 103rd session, taking its first step towards autonomous shipping that does not involve human vectors. This paper analyses the security issues that are potentially involved in fully autonomous ships (Degree Four of Autonomy) (DOA 4) of MASS operations and recommend measures to adjust and mitigate the issues. This paper reviews six conventional maritime security threats that could threaten a DOA 4 vessel, including piracy and armed robbery at sea, terrorism, smuggling and trafficking, stowaways, cyber security threat and hybrid security threat. The research methodology of this paper reviews different literature as the source of both quantitative data and qualitative evidence.
This paper analyses the experience of the security incidents in other comparable sectors and systems in order to identify the characteristics and behaviour of the security threats. Then the information is analysed against the specific characteristics of MASS operations to consider whether the characteristics of MASS operations may become more vulnerable if exploited by perpetrators of security threats. Potential issues and scenarios of the security threats in the operations are also discussed. Risk assessments are applied to explore the risk level of the security threats in DOA 4 MASS. This paper demonstrates that the characteristics of DOA 4 MASS operations may still pose vulnerabilities that can be exploited by all the six security threats. The risk of terrorism, smuggling and trafficking, cyber security, and hybrid security threats are high in DOA 4 MASS operations, while the risk of piracy and armed robbery at sea and stowaways are medium. Both the aspects of cyber security, detection/monitoring equipment, reliability of vessel systems, security in Shore Control Centres (SCC) and security in ports contribute significantly to the security of DOA 4 MASS operations against these security threats.
This paper recommends all the aspects mentioned in the above findings should be considered in the development of future instruments regarding DOA 4 MASS operations. The stakeholders involved in DOA 4 MASS operations should apply any possible cyber security and detection/monitoring measures even beyond the legal requirement. The security and personnel management of SCC should be ensured too. Finally, further research on the identified security threats on DOA 4 MASS operations is recommended once more practical data on the operations are available, further research on different DOA of MASS operations and different security threats are also recommended.
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A New AI-Driven Risk Assessment Tool for Investigating Insider Theft and Associated Maritime Crimes in a Southeast Asian Energy Company—A Case Study
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Ever since criminal networks have recognized the profit in oil and energy pipelines, the theft of hydrocarbon-based products has jeopardized the stability and security of global regions. Although numerous pipelines run across land and below the oceans, tankers serve as the most efficient way of transporting crude oil and natural gas between continents. This applied research study describes a novel AI-powered, a voice-based tool that identified human risk in a multi-national Southeast Asian energy company weakened by large-scale internal theft. 78.6 percent of completed automated interviews resulted in risk-positive evaluations. Ground truth from testimonial interviews and an internal investigation verified 92.6 percent of scrutinized flags. Previously undiscovered details were identified by the automated tool regarding the scope, size, and scale of crime issues, involving all job levels and local politicians. Analyses provided evidence of the technology’s non-biased nature and demonstrated that its algorithm-generated outputs may be more dependable than observable behavioural cues. Findings (1) describe a potential decision support tool for detecting risk in situ, (2) contribute to employee fraud and internal theft literature, and (3) indicate that in the southeast Asian energy industry, approval for the approach described and recognition of its contribution are overwhelming.
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Reviews
Piracy and the Privatisation of Maritime Security: Vessel Protection Policies Compared
Reviewed By: Dr Jessica K. Simonds
“Maritime Security and the Law of the Sea: Help or Hindrance?”
Reviewed By: Dr Katinka Svanberg
South China Sea Developments and Implications for Freedom of Navigation
Reviewed By: David Letts
Online Resources
Maritime crime and security resources online
Reviewed By:
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
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