International Journal of Maritime Crime & Security

Shipping is the lifeblood of world trade and the global economy, but in order to maintain its growth and manage its impact on the social-economic climate, agreement of global rules, specifically the flagging of its vessels, is critical. The international shipping industry is responsible for the carriage of around 90% of world trade and there are over 50,000 merchant ships trading internationally, under flags registered in over 150 nations. Although 98 per cent of world trade has taken place under World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules (UNCTAD, 2018), the use of Flags of Convenience (FOC) and protectionism is on the rise and is viewed as a viable policy option by some countries. This paper examines growing concerns regarding the increased protectionist approach taken by the United States of America (USA), Russia and China regarding the carriage of their energy exports. Two potential game-changing trends are the Energizing American Maritime Act (2017) which proposes that 15 percent of American exports of crude oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) should to be transported on USA flagged vessels by 2020 and 30 percent by 2025, and, Russia’s plans to restrict loadings of hydrocarbon cargoes at Northern Sea Route ports, to Russian-flagged vessels. Further, in January 2018, China issued a White Paper on its strategic approach to the Northern Sea Route (NSR) signaling its move from partnership to a position of dominance taking advantage of this shortcut to Europe and the for extracting natural resources from the Arctic seabed as a result of global climate change. Although the details of these inward-looking policies and restrictions are not yet clear, these intended actions are concerning, and could create a precedent for other nations to follow. 

This paper explores what is meant by ‘Maritime Crime’ and ‘Maritime Security’, building on the work of Natalie Klein and Christian Bueger. The term Maritime Security means different things to different people, while Maritime Crime, whereas perhaps easier to define, has been neglected by criminologists and crime scientists whose perspective has largely remained landlocked.  Given the enormous value of maritime assets – not just ships but offshore energy platforms, wind turbines, ports and harbours – this is a strange omission.  The seas carry some 90 percent of world trade by volume and 70 percent by value and cover 71 percent of the earth’s surface. International communication depends on undersea cables. The value of seaborne traffic, whether goods, raw materials or information, makes it supremely attractive to criminals. It also acts as a magnet for fraud. An obvious manifestation is the continuing scourge of piracy, which, while technically a crime, straddles the porous border between crime and security studies. Increasing automation also increases vulnerability to cyber-attack. The paper draws on other scholars’ earlier work and identifies two different if complementary approaches.  A ‘negative’ approach, which sees ‘security’ as protection against a range of threats, and a ‘positive’ approach which seeks to build good order at sea and on the littoral shore and to make sustainable use of the seas’ and oceans’ vast resources. This includes the development of the ‘Blue Economy’.  Although sea levels may rise with global warming, paradoxically a process of territorialisation is underway as states seek not only to exploit their Exclusive Economic Zones but even to extend them, by utilising the provisions of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.  Thus, in a political and legal sense the ‘high seas’ are not rising at all but being stripped away. 

Purpose: This paper carries out an investigation into the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), also known as drones, in border security and their ability to enhance existing security measures in Kuwait’s ports and borders and also along borders of the United States.  Considering UAVs are currently deployed by the military as well as by private companies and individuals throughout the world, including Kuwait, very little scholarly work has addressed the use of UAVs in advancing port security. The purpose of this paper is to appraise the advantages and disadvantages of UAVs in the context of improving Kuwait’s and the US port and border security.
 

Research Approach: The main research question proposed is how can UAVs be effectively utilised to enhance port security?  Both primary and secondary data were collected. The primary data collection involved both qualitative and quantitative methods.  Primary data was collected using an online survey issued to 66 port-related respondents and from five semi-structure telephone interviews, with a subset of the survey respondents.
 

Findings and Originality: The primary data analysis revealed that port officials are aware that UAV technologies can bring a significant improvement to their security. Still, there are risks associated with the implementation of such a system, especially concerning the threat of terrorist organisations and cyber security. Therefore, it was concluded that, for the successful implementation of this technology in port security, a proper framework needs to be set in place. Recommendations for this framework are proposed in this research.  The interview findings further explain the current security concerns of ports, the manner in which UAVs can contribute to port security and the associated risks and formulate a series of recommendations concerning these risks. The respondents unanimously agreed to the registration system of all UAV users, similar to motor vehicle licence plates, indicating a higher level of control could diminish the risk of unauthorised aerial breaches of port security using drones.
 

Research Impact: The research addresses a significant gap in the literature on the deployment of an emergent technology in ports for the purposes of surveillance in advancement of both safety and security.
 

Practical Impact: The study contributes to practice by making the following recommendations: introduce the use of UAVs to enhance port security, especially for monitoring and surveillance purposes; ensure pilots are certified with the Basic National UAS Certificate for small Unmanned Aircraft (BNUC-S); introduce a system whereby all UAV flights, their pilots and training are recorded on a central data management system, such as airfleetmanager; improve legislation regarding port security in order to encompass cases of cyber security and information sharing security, acknowledging the risks and provide recommendations for their reduction; include a focus on port security in the main cyber security frameworks and make governmental bodies accountable for port security.

This paper provides an analysis of efforts to improve maritime security in East and West Africa. While maritime issues in general have been largely ignored in both regions over the past decades, they are increasingly recognized due to the potential of the ‘blue economy’. This is highlighted by a look at three specific aspects related to maritime security: offshore oil and gas production, maritime trade, and problems with IUU fishing. While those are not the only three sectors that are relevant in this context, they are useful to illustrate the complex relationships between different actors at sea and to show that maritime developments can have very direct implications on land. Furthermore, most challenges in the maritime environment are transnational by nature, such as oil and gas fields straddling maritime boundaries, migratory fish stocks that are exploited in different jurisdictions or attacks against merchant ships which may impact ports across an entire region. In the final section, the paper underlines similarities and differences in the responses to maritime security challenges in East and West Africa over the past decade. Both regions share some traits that create opportunities to draw on lessons learned, both on the national and the regional level. Several recommendations for different stakeholders are also included in the final section of the paper.

The traditional view of maritime security is epitomised by warships, but this is a narrow and naive way to look at contemporary maritime security.  Maritime security consists of several elements, as is white light passed through a triangular prism.  However, translation is key, and many languages use the same word for safety and security.  Consequently, there is no internationally recognised definition for maritime security.  The commercial shipping industry, which dominates the oceans by number, emphasise safety, whereas navies concentrate on security.  The adoption of the International Ships and Port Facilities Security (ISPS) Code by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) in 2004, introduced the first security code for the maritime industry.  Whilst it has been effective, it is limited in scope philosophically and literally to countering terrorism, restricting its utility across the spectrum of maritime security.  As the shipping industry confronts the challenges and hazards of the interconnected cyber space, crucial to the increasing efficiency of the industry, cyber risk management has been incorporated as part of the maritime safety management ethos, without confronting the extent and realities of cyber security.  The diversity and complexity of maritime security, especially those caused by climate change are becoming progressively more evident and may require an innovative approach.