International Journal of Maritime Crime & Security

Nowadays, the pressure for enhanced attention to critical infrastructure security and the focused concern on threats emanating from both domestic and foreign terrorist groups have fostered new challenges for Petrochemical Seaports and Offshore Terminals (PSOTs). These tendencies dictate to maintain comprehensive security regimens that can be integrated with national and international strategies to support the country’s security against terrorism. Therefore, the need for a Security Risk Management (SRM) programme will be an essential part of the business of running a seaport particularly if the addressed port or terminal is handling hazardous chemicals produced from a nearby plant or refinery for export purposes. As a result, by the use of a case study in this paper, the identified security risk factors for an offshore Single Point Mooring (SPM) terminal located inshore side of the seaport of Mina al Fahal in Sultanate of Oman will be assessed by introducing its designated Security Risk Factor Table (SRFT) in order to examine the vulnerability of the addressed terminal. Consequently, the proposed framework can be used by intelligence analysts or port security and risk managers for the protection of these critical infrastructures. Suitable mitigation measures and further treatments for lessening the impact of a successful terrorist attack or potential likelihood of other threats in PSOTs facilities will be studied carefully.

This article discusses the use of PCASPs as an alternative or additional layer of protection on board ships in the fight against maritime piracy and armed robbery at sea from an international law perspective based on legal positivism. A concern is that clear-cut, international legal rules are missing on PCASPs. A particular concern is the use of force by PCASPs.

The IMO, the shipping- and PMSC industry have had to resort to soft law instruments and self-regulations. The perceived lack of legal rules concerning PCASPs and PMSCs has resulted in a lot of criticism. But does international law on maritime piracy need to develop binding international legal rules’ that are directly applicable to PCASPs? My findings are that the existing legal framework, in the Law of the Sea, SOLAS Convention, customary international law on self-defence together with the non-binding IMO guidelines and the shipping industry’s and PMSC’s self-regulations, as implemented by national laws,  gives the necessary framework to adequately address the issue of PCASPs  as protection against maritime piracy.

The article describes maritime piracy, piracy hotspots and how intervention against piracy differs according to regions. It analyses the current legal framework on maritime piracy and armed robbery at sea in UNCLOS and the SUA Convention, flag-state jurisdiction and national laws. It defines “soft law” and goes through regulations on PCASPs from the Montreux Document and ICoC to regulations that directly address the use of PCASPs on board ships, as the IMO Guidelines, ISO Standards, the industries standard agreements and Guidance on the use of for.