International Journal of Maritime Crime & Security

This paper concerns itself with the configuration of security at sea, arguing that its implementation is not solely within the security actor’s control. Rather, maritime security configurations are constructed as a result of intended and unintended actions and implications, melding security and insecurity together as a singular sphere of activity. Narrowing in on the specific case of migration governance, this paper investigates the role of international legal obligations and limitations for security actors at sea in understanding the operationalisation of maritime migration security. Questions of the construction of maritime security configurations are considered with reference to boarding and searching of vessels, search and rescue (SAR) and access to territorial waters, perceived through the practice based assemblage approach. It is proposed that assemblage theory is suited to accessing complex relationships between security and international law. Attending to Central Mediterranean migration governance, this paper reflects a reading of international law that resulted in a stagnation of security on the high seas. The convictions of this paper are three-fold. Firstly and primarily, the implementation of a maritime security initiative is not solely within the control of the securitising actor. Secondly, maritime security configurations are malleable, and shaped by unplanned elements, including international legal obligations and instruments. Finally, maritime security is an assemblage, constructed as a result of intentional and unintentional independent elements which form relationships and result in a unique security configuration. The findings demonstrate that international law forms an important aspect of maritime migration security configurations or assemblages, and significantly shapes such operations.

With the proliferation of post-Cold War globalisation, the international community began to appreciate the immense importance of maritime security. In recent decades, numerous national, regional, and global information sharing centres have been established with an aim to provide relevant stakeholders with an assessment of the risks and threats within the maritime domain. Unfortunately, international organisations failed to simultaneously emphasise the importance of standardised terminology and definitions for use in the global maritime security context.

Instead of using other standardised areas of the maritime industry such as maritime safety as a guide, dozens of government agencies, regional reporting centres, private maritime security companies, and information sharing/fusion centres have now been established. Each of these uses its own unique categories, terminology, and definitions to measure and catalogue regional and global incidents of violent maritime crime. In this article, that includes acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships. In some cases, political and economic bias has played a significant role in how maritime security incident data is officially recorded and presented to the public. This lack of data cohesion has resulted in significant confusion and distrust amongst the shipping industry and policymakers. It has also created an uncertain environment for seafarers, who largely depend on their employers and regulators to keep them safe and secure at sea.

The research includes an analysis of several sets of qualitative and quantitative data from prominent agencies and reporting centres. Case studies are also presented to illustrate why harmonised terminology, definitions, and incident reporting protocols are integral to achieving global maritime domain awareness. The numerous challenges to achieving this goal are then explored and proposed solutions are presented. The paper concludes by proposing a lexicon for incidents of violent maritime crime, as a first step in creating a common lexicon for global maritime security. As stated in earlier issues, this journal does not seek to promote a common definition of maritime security, but a common lexicon is of more practical use.

This article is based on a dissertation completed as part of the master’s degree in Maritime Security at Coventry University in 2022.